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Thoughtful article in the WSJ re: last night's game.
The assertion is that the Patriots did exactly what the Broncos tried to do last year - that is, throw short, quick passes - to beat the Seahawks. And while that generalization is true, I think the author fails to note some key differences (the big ones being execution and coaching):
1) The Patriots were not afraid to throw towards the middle of the field. Despite WRs getting blasted, they continued to challenge the middle of the field. On the other hand, Denver kept trying to attack the sidelines (e.g., out routes), which was much less effective. The Broncos - whether out of fear or just poor planning - wouldn't take the openings in the middle.
2) The Patriots utilized all of their pass catchers - WRs, TEs, and RBs - which often put players like Wagner and Chancellor into pass coverage when matched up against Gronk or Vereen. Denver rarely attempted to hit its RBs in short passing routes.
3) The Patriots had multiple short/quick options to go to, from Vereen to Amendola to Edelman. Denver built its receivers around the prototypical WR mold - D. Thomas, Decker - bigger receivers that rely on size and strength over speed.
4) The Patriots have Gronk. No way any safety or LB stops him one-on-one. Whereas J. Thomas is hit-or-miss.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-...hatsNewsSecond
The assertion is that the Patriots did exactly what the Broncos tried to do last year - that is, throw short, quick passes - to beat the Seahawks. And while that generalization is true, I think the author fails to note some key differences (the big ones being execution and coaching):
1) The Patriots were not afraid to throw towards the middle of the field. Despite WRs getting blasted, they continued to challenge the middle of the field. On the other hand, Denver kept trying to attack the sidelines (e.g., out routes), which was much less effective. The Broncos - whether out of fear or just poor planning - wouldn't take the openings in the middle.
2) The Patriots utilized all of their pass catchers - WRs, TEs, and RBs - which often put players like Wagner and Chancellor into pass coverage when matched up against Gronk or Vereen. Denver rarely attempted to hit its RBs in short passing routes.
3) The Patriots had multiple short/quick options to go to, from Vereen to Amendola to Edelman. Denver built its receivers around the prototypical WR mold - D. Thomas, Decker - bigger receivers that rely on size and strength over speed.
4) The Patriots have Gronk. No way any safety or LB stops him one-on-one. Whereas J. Thomas is hit-or-miss.
Only Bill Belichick could look at a team that lost by 35 points and decide he has to steal their ideas.
A year ago, the Seattle Seahawks vaulted to the top of the football world by dismantling Peyton Manning’s Denver Broncos, 43-8, in Super Bowl XLVIII. The Seahawks did it by forcing virtually all of Manning’s throws to be short, harmless tosses. That was all that Seattle’s fortress of a defense would allow—little passes in front of them that went for negligible yardage.
So when Belichick and the New England Patriots needed a strategy for Sunday’s Super Bowl, he chose seemingly the most irrational one possible: an attack based on those short, seemingly harmless tosses.
It wasn’t the most brilliant game plan in history, but it may have been the most practical.
New England’s dinking and dunking down the field was the football equivalent of driving cross-country because you’re afraid to fly. It took the Patriots forever to get to their destination, but they got there. Although the interception Seattle threw at the goal line—an unforced error unlike any in sports history—gave New England the victory, it was the Patriots’ counterintuitive offensive approach that got them in position to win in the first place. That strategy enabled them to overcome a 10-point fourth-quarter deficit against one of the greatest defenses in NFL history.
In fact, Tom Brady , the game’s most valuable player and perhaps the greatest quarterback in history, was historically conservative Sunday night. There have been 88 quarterbacks to play in the Super Bowl. Only six of those had a worse mark than his 8.86 yards per completion. All of those quarterbacks lost—including Peyton Manning.
Given the many strengths of the Seattle defense, though, Belichick’s ploy made sense. What do you do when your opponent has built a defense that prevents you from throwing deep, eliminates the popular “back-shoulder” sideline throw” and basically walls off the outside of the field? You swear off huge chunks of a typical football game plan. Sunday’s Super Bowl was about a team admitting its limitations.
About three years ago, the Seahawks decided that big, physical cornerbacks, who were undervalued in the speed-obsessed NFL, were the way to stop the league’s best passers. Cornerback Richard Sherman became a star, and Seattle’s roster of 6 feet-and-over cornerbacks provided no room for wide receivers to operate.
But wide receiver Julian Edelman knew things would be different on Sunday. “You’re not going to run fades on them. I’m 5-10; they’re 6-2,” Edelman said. “Coach kept on saying, ‘You’ve got to use your quickness.’ ”
That is exactly what happened. Time after time, Brady would find receivers over the middle of the field for one of those short, quick passes that the Seahawks would allow. Then the receiver—Edelman, Brandon LaFell, Rob Gronkowski or Danny Amendola—would simply dive ahead and get a few yards where they could. It wasn’t particularly glamorous.
New England avoided throwing at Sherman, which could be considered an act of football cowardice. Counterpoint: The Patriots didn’t care. Edelman knew that such routes would work on the Seahawks’ big defensive backs, since they couldn’t move as quickly in tight spaces as the Patriots receivers.
So the question becomes: Why haven’t other teams successfully employed Belichick’s plan? That is complicated. NFL coaches can be stubborn, yes, but there is also the belief that if you are good at something, you shouldn’t abandon it, no matter the circumstances. So teams that rely on throwing outside and deep—common in today’s NFL—tend to do so despite the odds.
There were always whispers about how to beat the Seahawks. The San Francisco 49ers, for instance, knew that they could annoy the rival Seahawks by shifting to those sleek speedsters, but then that would complicate the 49ers’ blocking schemes. So they never really made much of an effort.
There were routes that coaches around the league privately knew could get those big cornerbacks gasping for air—double moves that require a few jukes—but the quarterbacks would need to hang in the pocket to deliver those passes, a tough task against the ferocious Seahawks pass defense. The Patriots decided it was best to get the ball out quickly Sunday night.
Of course, the lasting memory from this game will be Malcolm Butler’s game-saving interception for New England—or, rather, Seahawks coach Pete Carroll’s inexplicable decision to call for a pass from the goal line in the final minute instead of a run. But when NFL strategy aficionados study this game, they may see the end of an era.
Since the Seahawks burst onto the scene in 2012, every team was looking to get taller. Receivers who looked like power forwards became trendy, as did cornerbacks who were 6 feet and up. But on Sunday night, Belichick and Brady unveiled the blueprint: if a team is great at something, don’t give them a chance to execute it.
A year ago, the Seattle Seahawks vaulted to the top of the football world by dismantling Peyton Manning’s Denver Broncos, 43-8, in Super Bowl XLVIII. The Seahawks did it by forcing virtually all of Manning’s throws to be short, harmless tosses. That was all that Seattle’s fortress of a defense would allow—little passes in front of them that went for negligible yardage.
So when Belichick and the New England Patriots needed a strategy for Sunday’s Super Bowl, he chose seemingly the most irrational one possible: an attack based on those short, seemingly harmless tosses.
It wasn’t the most brilliant game plan in history, but it may have been the most practical.
New England’s dinking and dunking down the field was the football equivalent of driving cross-country because you’re afraid to fly. It took the Patriots forever to get to their destination, but they got there. Although the interception Seattle threw at the goal line—an unforced error unlike any in sports history—gave New England the victory, it was the Patriots’ counterintuitive offensive approach that got them in position to win in the first place. That strategy enabled them to overcome a 10-point fourth-quarter deficit against one of the greatest defenses in NFL history.
In fact, Tom Brady , the game’s most valuable player and perhaps the greatest quarterback in history, was historically conservative Sunday night. There have been 88 quarterbacks to play in the Super Bowl. Only six of those had a worse mark than his 8.86 yards per completion. All of those quarterbacks lost—including Peyton Manning.
Given the many strengths of the Seattle defense, though, Belichick’s ploy made sense. What do you do when your opponent has built a defense that prevents you from throwing deep, eliminates the popular “back-shoulder” sideline throw” and basically walls off the outside of the field? You swear off huge chunks of a typical football game plan. Sunday’s Super Bowl was about a team admitting its limitations.
About three years ago, the Seahawks decided that big, physical cornerbacks, who were undervalued in the speed-obsessed NFL, were the way to stop the league’s best passers. Cornerback Richard Sherman became a star, and Seattle’s roster of 6 feet-and-over cornerbacks provided no room for wide receivers to operate.
But wide receiver Julian Edelman knew things would be different on Sunday. “You’re not going to run fades on them. I’m 5-10; they’re 6-2,” Edelman said. “Coach kept on saying, ‘You’ve got to use your quickness.’ ”
That is exactly what happened. Time after time, Brady would find receivers over the middle of the field for one of those short, quick passes that the Seahawks would allow. Then the receiver—Edelman, Brandon LaFell, Rob Gronkowski or Danny Amendola—would simply dive ahead and get a few yards where they could. It wasn’t particularly glamorous.
New England avoided throwing at Sherman, which could be considered an act of football cowardice. Counterpoint: The Patriots didn’t care. Edelman knew that such routes would work on the Seahawks’ big defensive backs, since they couldn’t move as quickly in tight spaces as the Patriots receivers.
So the question becomes: Why haven’t other teams successfully employed Belichick’s plan? That is complicated. NFL coaches can be stubborn, yes, but there is also the belief that if you are good at something, you shouldn’t abandon it, no matter the circumstances. So teams that rely on throwing outside and deep—common in today’s NFL—tend to do so despite the odds.
There were always whispers about how to beat the Seahawks. The San Francisco 49ers, for instance, knew that they could annoy the rival Seahawks by shifting to those sleek speedsters, but then that would complicate the 49ers’ blocking schemes. So they never really made much of an effort.
There were routes that coaches around the league privately knew could get those big cornerbacks gasping for air—double moves that require a few jukes—but the quarterbacks would need to hang in the pocket to deliver those passes, a tough task against the ferocious Seahawks pass defense. The Patriots decided it was best to get the ball out quickly Sunday night.
Of course, the lasting memory from this game will be Malcolm Butler’s game-saving interception for New England—or, rather, Seahawks coach Pete Carroll’s inexplicable decision to call for a pass from the goal line in the final minute instead of a run. But when NFL strategy aficionados study this game, they may see the end of an era.
Since the Seahawks burst onto the scene in 2012, every team was looking to get taller. Receivers who looked like power forwards became trendy, as did cornerbacks who were 6 feet and up. But on Sunday night, Belichick and Brady unveiled the blueprint: if a team is great at something, don’t give them a chance to execute it.
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